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thus, the category is not helpful (13). Sidnie argues that the texts not shared
by other Jewish groups are sectarian.
To complicate matters further, what she calls affiliated texts are not considered sectarian because it was “more widely known in Judaism and in early
Christianity” (223). However, most scholars like her include D(amascus) as
sectarian, although it was also found elsewhere—e.g., Enoch, Jubilees and the
Levi traditions—suggesting a wider distribution of some of the “sectarian ideas.”
If sectarianism is defined thematically, as Crawford also does, then “sectarian”
documents are also not unique, based on specific topics like predeterminism,
eschatological ideas, or community rules—as she argued (ch[s]. 6 and 7)—since
all of these themes have been found in religious texts elsewhere. Although all of
these problems in defining sectarianism have been raised and evaluated by Jutta
Jokiranta (Social Identity and Sectarianism in the Qumran Movement. Edited by
Florentino García Martínez. STDJ 105. [Leiden: Brill, 2013]), Crawford still
persists with the idea of separating the DSS by subjective categories.
I do not think this adds to her argument of the DSS representing a
library. Quite the opposite, if the DSS was a library, it is better to separate
the documents by genre or maybe by the category of biblical and non-biblical
materials. But even the latter classification is not without problems. This
would add to her portrayal of the distribution of documents in the caves. It
seems that the only peculiarity of some of the DSS is the use of some vocabulary (‘dh, ychd, ‘tzt hychd, `nshy tmym qwdsh, mbqr, mshkyl; see 14–15 and
229) and the whole interpretative framework found in many manuscripts.
As she recognizes, “the question is whether one is more impressed with the
similarities or the differences between documents” (274–275). And, like her,
I tend to see more similarities and therefore consider the DSS as a library. The
strength of Sidnie Crawford’s work lies in this particular perspective. She has
produced a well-crafted book that I highly recommend.
Berrien Springs, Michigan

Rodrigo Galiza
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Wm. Curtis Holtzen (DTh., University of South Africa) is professor of
philosophy and theology at Hope International University, and co-editor
of Connecting Faith and Science: Philosophical and Theological Inquiries
(Claremont, CA: Claremont Press, 2017); In Spirit and in Truth: Philosophical Reflections on Liturgy and Worship, Claremont Studies in Science
and Religion 1 (Claremont, CA: Claremont Press, 2016); and By Faith and
Reason: The Essential Keith Ward (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2012). Also,
Holtzen has made important contributions to scholarship in several articles
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and book chapters (see https://www.hiu.edu/about-hiu/directory-detail.
php?staff=wm-holtzen).
Holtzen’s recent book, The God Who Trusts, begins with a “Foreword”
by John Saunders (x–xii) and “Acknowledgments” (xiii–xv). Then, the first
chapter (“Considering a God Who Trusts”) introduces Holtzen’s thesis
(1–21), gives a response to objections (21–28), and overviews his other
chapters (28–29). He proposes that God’s perfection includes trust (i.e.,
God is a “being of faith”) as is evident in the purpose of creation, human
free will, an open future, and divine passibility (4). Facing an open future,
God has no “definite foreknowledge” of free choices that are not “fixed or
settled” (15); and God is passible since his emotions and knowledge are
influenced by his creation (16–21).
In subsequent chapters, Holtzen presents “The Mosaic of Faith” (chapter
2), which includes that God loves (chapter 3), believes (chapter 4), trusts
(chapter 5), and hopes (chapter 6). Finally, there is a discussion of “Divine
Faith and the Advent of Christ” (chapter 7) and a conclusion (chapter 8). The
following excerpts summarize Holtzen’s proposal. Faith is “a dynamic integration of belief, trust, hope, and loving devotion;” and “love requires mutual
faith.” “God has hope that we will respond to God’s invitation.” Divine
experience includes “belief that [knowledge]” and “belief in [trust],” which is
a “willingness to risk something of value to the care of another person.” There
is a “relationship of mutual faith between God the Father and Jesus” who had
“faith mixed with doubt.” Finally, “if God is our moral example then perhaps
God too is our faith example. … a model for all to imitate” (28–29).
Holtzen’s reasonable responses to possible objections supports and clarifies his thesis. The first objection is that God does not trust humans since we
are “completely untrustworthy.” Holtzen responds that “humans are totally
depraved … but not totally” (21). While in scope “there is no part of our
world” or “our lives” that is “unaffected by sin,” in depth “the totality of our
being is not absolutely perverted by sin” (ibid.). Therefore, “the first act of
divine faith” in us “is God entrusting us with grace” (22).
The second objection is that “Scripture does not reveal” Holtzen’s thesis
(4), since “divine faith is not explicitly biblical” and “nowhere in Scripture is
there a description of God’s faith” (23). Holtzen responds that there is also
no explicit reference to “omnipotence, omniscience, creatio ex nihilo, and the
Trinity;” and these are not “a test of fellowship” even if the Bible “allows for
such interpretations” (23). At the same time, Holtzen is confident in his thesis
since he writes: “I believe the Bible does have something to say about the faith
of God, even if not explicitly, and … I will try to demonstrate that the Bible
is not wholly silent on such matters” (23).
The third objection is that there is “no Christian tradition of divine faith”
(23). Holtzen responds that “new understandings are not always meant to
supplant the tradition but to supervene upon it” (24). Therefore, a “theology
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of divine faith … is clearly linked to and is a logical outworking of the great
Christian tradition;” “a new leaf ” on “the great family tree” (ibid.).
The fourth objection is that language about God is “anthropomorphic
and metaphoric” (24). Holtzen responds that: “Poetic imagery for God”
uses “common objects;” “anthropomorphisms speak of God having physical human characteristics;” and “anthropathic utterances” apply “human
emotions” to God. Some of these are “more literal than others” (25). If they
“never represent God as God actually is, then what can be said of God’s love,
plans, will, wisdom, or goodness? Can it even be said that God is a living God
or that God has being?” (ibid.). Also, it is better to refer to “theopathism” since
“depictions of God’s emotions may not be mere reflections of the ways God is
like humans but [also of ] ways in which we are like God” (26).
This theopathic reading of Scripture undergirds Holtzen’s persuasive
proposal that God trusts because the purpose of creation is a love relationship
with persons who have genuine freedom (3–12) in a world that is open epistemologically and ontologically (13–16). The Bible describes God as changeable in his feelings or emotions (18–19). God is “moved to pity” (Judg 2:18),
“grieved” (Ps 78:40), and “sorry” (Gen 6:6) because of humans (18). This is
also implied in the fact that humans are created in the image of God (19–20),
who is “perfect in love” (20). In all his chapters, Holtzen supports his thesis
through dialogue with an impressive number of scholars (see bibliography,
235–252; and author index, 253–256) and through analysis of biblical texts
that depict God as if he trusts (see Scripture index, 261–263; and subject
index, 257–259). I think that Holtzen could have further supported his thesis
by considering the biblical teaching that “God is faithful” (1 Cor 1:9; 10:13;
2 Cor 1:18) and is the “God of hope” (Rom 15:13).
With regard to implications of this study for divine foreknowledge, an
ambiguity (about whether or not God foreknows) appears when Holtzen
writes about what God believes and knows about future free choices. He asks:
Since “God may not know” future free choices, “what does God believe”
about them? (93; cf. 92, 101). Then he answers: “God believes (and thus
knows) the potential truth of each statement … God has a belief about my
future free actions, but God’s belief is actually about the present. God knows
our history, our wants and desires, our dispositions and abilities. This is how
God knows the chances” or likelihood of our future free choices (103). This
ambiguity is explained in part by Holtzen’s distinction between God believing
that (knowledge) and believing in (trust) (28, 92–127).
There is the same ambiguity when Holtzen states, “If God has exhaustive
definite foreknowledge of all future free human choices, in the same way God
has such knowledge of past and present choices, then any discussion of God’s
faith is irrelevant, because faith is occasioned, in part, by the unknown” (15).
Here, it is ambiguous whether God has different ways of knowing the past,
present, and future and whether there is an actual “unknown” beyond God’s
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foreknowledge. Again, the ambiguity is explained, in part, when Holtzen
comments on Nelson Pike’s 1965 article, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action” (published in God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom, ed. John Martin
Fischer [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989]). Holtzen states that
“open theists have generally agreed” with Pike “that human freedom and
exhaustive divine foreknowledge are incompatible;” and that God “could be
omniscient although he did not hold beliefs about the outcome of human
actions in advance” (94). The need to carefully clarify the use of “limit”
language about God is highlighted in Richard Rice’s chapter “Does Open
Theism Limit God?” in his 2020 book, The Future of Open Theism (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2020).
An additional and significant clarification of the ambiguity is given
when Holtzen explains that, while God is omniscient with regard to statements about the future, it is impossible for him to know these statements
as true or false (bivalent) if they are neither true nor false (non-bivalent).
Thus, there are various options for understanding foreknowledge based on
whether we choose to accept or reject bivalence (93–106). These options
may be evaluated in terms of biblical statements about God making “I
will” statements and then relenting in response to our free choices, e.g., Jer
18:7–10 (95–97).
First, we may choose (as Holtzen does) “non-bivalence” where statements about future free choices are neither true nor false (102–105). As such,
“God holds true beliefs about the past and present that can be translated
in ways that reveal God’s [changing] mental states about [the likelihood or
potential truth of ] future free contingents” (105). God’s “I will” statements
are interpreted as expressing conditional inclinations; and his knowledge of
potential truth about our future free choices becomes knowledge of actual
truth when we make our choices (103–104). This involves a more literal view
of God changing his mind than of God’s “I will” statements.
Second, we may choose “standard bivalence” which “affirms that all
statements, even future free contingent statements, are either true or false”
(97). Therefore, omniscience would include all true statements about the
future, God would never change his mind (98), and foreknowledge would
be a static and unchanging anticipation. This option is incompatible with
Holtzen’s understanding of divine trust and with the views of open and
relational theists in general.
Third, we may choose “contrarian bivalence,” in which “definitive
statements concerning future free choices actions are never true [or false]
prior to the event” (101). In this option, “I will” means “I might,” as if
“God finally makes up God’s mind, not that God changes God’s mind”
(102). While similar to option one with regard to God’s “I will” statements,
option three is incompatible with Holtzen’s more literal understanding of
God changing his mind.
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Fourth, we may choose (as I do) “preventative bivalence” where “statements concerning future free contingents are either true or false but also
that their truth value can change” (99). Holtzen states that this option has
a “real force … over other approaches” (100); but he rejects it based on the
question, “Does God ever believe, and therefore know” which “preventable
truths will not be prevented?” (101; cf. 93). Nevertheless, the Bible indicates
that God foreknew the preventable future that David would be king (1 Sam
16:1), and revealed to David a preventable future attack by Saul, which David
prevented (23:11–13) so that he became king (2 Sam 2:11; 5:3). Therefore,
God’s foreknowledge of future free choices may be exhaustive, definite, and
dynamic—in harmony with Holtzen’s view of God’s trust in his “dynamic
relationship with humanity” (95). For a proposal concerning dynamic
foreknowledge, see Martin Hanna, “Foreknowledge and the Freedom of
Salvation” in Salvation: Contours of Adventist Soteriology (Theological Studies
11, Martin F. Hanna, Darius W. Jankiewicz, and John W. Reeve, eds., [Berrien
Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 2018]).
Holtzen’s book is an excellent resource for those who are interested in the
biblical and philosophical issues raised by open and relational theism. While
I hold a different view of God’s foreknowledge in relation to the bivalence (or
non-bivalence) of statements about future free choices, this does not detract
from the value of this book. The survey of options related to bivalence is very
helpful for evaluating the issues of divine trust and foreknowledge. Also, as
indicated in the earlier parts of my review, Holtzen has cogently accomplished
his main goal of presenting a support for his central thesis, which may be
summarized as follows: “Love” (1 Cor 13:4) “believes” and “hopes” (13:7),
and “God is love” (1 John 4:8, 16; see pp. 60, 228); therefore, as announced
in the title of the book, he is The God Who Trusts.
Andrews University

Martin F. Hanna

Korpman, Matthew J. Saying No to God: A Radical Approach to Reading the
Bible Faithfully. Orange, CA: Quoir, 2019. 358 pp. Softcover. USD 16.46.
In Saying No to God, Matthew J. Korpman has written a treatise on theological
disagreement. A graduate from La Sierra University and Yale Divinity School
currently pursuing doctoral degrees (Hebrew Bible and New Testament), Korpman calls himself a “theological arsonist” looking for ways to set traditional ways
of reading the Bible on fire. In this spinoff of millennial theological reflection,
Korpman builds a case for a working postmodern biblical hermeneutic and in
the process, sacrifices many a sacred cow on the altar of his “pyrotheology.”
The book boasts the endorsement of Brian McLaren and Peter Rollins
among others and builds on the “hermeneutics of suspicion” famously
championed by Peter Enns (Inspiration and Incarnation: Evangelicals and the

